Chapter 06
Scoping — from system inventory to engagement
Last reviewed 2026-05-01
Scoping decides what you test, and therefore what you don’t test. Skip scoping discipline and you’ll test the system everyone is loudest about, not the system that most warrants attention.
Start from the inventory
Pull the AI System Inventory (see AI-CTRL-001 and the AI Governance Toolkit’s Inventory module). For each system, rate four dimensions:
- Impact (1–5): If this system fails or is compromised, how bad?
- Exposure (1–5): How accessible is it to external actors or to broad internal user groups?
- Autonomy (1–5): How much real-world action can it take without human review?
- Change velocity (1–5): How often does it materially change?
Multiply: a system scoring 5×5×5×5 (125) gets quarterly attack simulations; a system at 2×1×1×2 (4) may get annual evaluation.
Engagement-design questions
For the systems that warrant testing this cycle, walk through:
- What are we trying to learn? Validation of a specific control? Discovery of unknown failure modes? Evidence for a regulator?
- What’s the realistic threat actor? External actor with API access? Internal user with policy violation intent? Indirect attacker via supplied content?
- What outputs would change behavior? If the result is “no critical findings,” does that change anything? If yes, the engagement is worth doing; if no, reconsider scope or method.
- What can the engagement not do? Time, budget, data sensitivity, environment constraints.
If you cannot articulate answers to all four, the engagement is not ready to scope. Fix that before the planner.
In-scope vs. out-of-scope
Be explicit on:
- Components (the agent runtime, the tool layer, the memory store, RAG sources, downstream consumers).
- Environments (production with safeguards, staging, isolated test environment, synthetic).
- Data classes the engagement may produce or process (test data, synthetic, approved samples, never real PII without separate explicit authorization).
- Time windows and blackout periods.
Vague scope means inconclusive findings.
Pitfalls
- Scope creep mid-engagement. Lock scope at ROE sign-off. Mid-engagement expansion requires a documented amendment.
- Out-of-scope drift. Test outputs sometimes incidentally produce evidence about systems not in scope; preserve the evidence but do not act on it — escalate per chapter 4.
- Single-system tunnel vision. AI systems connect; an in-scope system’s failure may affect out-of-scope downstream consumers. Note these in the scope statement.